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This paper provides an overview of when a surety may be released from his or her 
obligations under a guarantee following a material variation to the principal lending 
contract. Part I frames the overall discussion by reviewing the role and importance of 
guarantees in contemporary commerce, outlining the central tenets of guarantee 
obligations, and distinguishing them as a subset of indemnities. Part II reviews how 
sureties have traditionally enjoyed a favoured status at law as well as what, in law, is 
considered to constitute a material variation. Part III introduces and sets out a 
longstanding rule governing the liability of sureties following a material variation to the 
principal contract. Part III examines the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Manulife Bank of Canada v Conlin and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v 
Negin and illustrates how the courts, under similar factual circumstances, arrived at 
conflicting outcomes. Part III summarizes the jurisprudence in Ontario following these 
decisions to show that most decisions have distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
judgment in Conlin on the grounds that later guarantees have not been prone to the same 
inconsistencies. This argument is bolstered by an in-depth review of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s recent decision in Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions, 
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Guarantees are among the earliest forms of contractual obligations to be recognized 
under English law.
1
 Briefly stated, a guarantee is a promise made by one party (known as 
the surety or guarantor) to be answerable for the due performance of some legal obligation 
of another party (known as the principal debtor).
2
 A guarantee may relate to the 
performance of an obligation, the discharge of a legal liability, or the payment of an 
outstanding debt.
3
 The Ontario Statute of Frauds states that a guarantee may involve “any 
special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of any other person.”
4
 In 
most cases, however, the guaranteed obligation will be in respect of an outstanding debt. 
More specifically, the guarantee is an undertaking designed to enhance the protections of a 
creditor in the event that a debtor fails to satisfy the payment obligations contained within 
the original lending agreement. Put another way, if a debtor defaults, a guarantee functions 
to provide the creditor with an alternate source of performance or payment. As a result, 
guarantees are among the most common types of security used in contemporary 




The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of when sureties may be 
released from their obligations under a guarantee following a material variation to the 
principal lending contract. Part I frames the overall discussion by reviewing the role and 
importance of guarantees in contemporary commerce, outlining the central tenets of 
guarantee obligations, and distinguishing them as a subset of indemnities. Part II reviews 
how sureties have traditionally enjoyed a favoured status at law as well as what, in law, is 
considered to constitute a material variation. Part III introduces and sets out a longstanding 
rule governing the liability of sureties following a material variation to the principal 
contract. Part III examines the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Manulife Bank 
of Canada v Conlin and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v Negin and 
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illustrates how the courts, under similar factual circumstances, arrived at conflicting 
outcomes. Part IV goes on to summarize the jurisprudence in Ontario following these 
decisions to show that most decisions have distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
judgment in Conlin on the grounds that later guarantees have not been prone to the same 
inconsistencies. This argument is bolstered by an in-depth review of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s recent decision in Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions, 
wherein the Court distinguished that case from Conlin and held the surety liable under her 
guarantee.  
PART I - GUARANTEES: A BACKGROUND 
I.I The Role of Guarantees in Contemporary Commerce 
 The importance of guarantees has not waned despite their longstanding role in 
contract law. Historically, banks and creditors would lend not based on collateral but based 
on guarantees or endorsements of bills of exchange, typically from the commercial entity or 
person that operated the business to which a loan was made.
6
 By contrast, in instances 
where banks and creditors lent on a secured basis, they would only do so in exchange for 
hard collateral, often in the form of government bonds or real estate mortgages.
7
  
 Today, it is commonly understood that much of the global economy, particularly 
the western world, relies on the ready availability of credit. As Walter William Fell 
described in 1811, 
 
The universal adoption of a system of credit in all mercantile transactions, and 
the prodigious extent to which that system is at present carried, has introduced, 
or at least very much increased, the practice of requiring counter securities 
against such credit or some other species of guarantee, for the performance of 
engagements entered into. The subject of mercantile guarantees may, therefore, 





Given the important role that credit serves in an economy, the laws and regulations that 
affect the relationships between creditors, debtors, and other interested parties exert an 
important influence on the economic growth and development of a nation or region. 
Generally speaking, laws that facilitate the extension of credit will fuel economic 
expansion, while those that restrict it will undermine and constrict economic growth. Noted 
legal scholar Kevin McGuinness writes that “the law relating to guarantees and other 
engagements of a similar nature is one branch of the law which clearly has a significant 
                                                 
6
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impact upon the rights of creditors and thus the flow of credit.”
9
 Thus, an analysis of the 
law relating to guarantee transactions is relevant from both a legal and economic 
perspective. In order to conduct such an analysis, however, it is important to have an 
adequate understanding of guarantees and the obligations they engender. 
I.II The Nature of Guarantee Obligations 
A guarantee is a promise by one person (known as the guarantor or surety) to be 
answerable for the due performance of the obligation(s) of another person (known as the 
principal or debtor) should the principal fail to perform the obligation as required.
10
 The 
Civil Code of Quebec defines a contract of guarantee, also referred to as a suretyship, as “a 
contract by which a person, the surety, binds himself towards the creditor, gratuitously or 
for remuneration, to perform the obligation of the debtor if he fails to fulfill it.”
11
 In a 
similar way, the common law defines a contract of guarantee as “a contract whereby one 
person (‘the surety’) promises another person (‘the creditor’) to be answerable in the event 
of a third person (‘the principal debtor’) making default in respect of a liability incurred or 
to be incurred by such third person to the promise.”
12
 This is distinct from other common 
forms of security such as mortgages or pledges because it only provides creditors with a 
promise of performance, rather than property, to which a creditor may seek recourse in the 
event of a default. 
Given that a guarantee is essentially an undertaking to answer for a debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another person, it is argued that guarantees possess the quality of an 
indemnity. In its most basic sense, an indemnity is a contract by which one party agrees to 
indemnify another against loss or damage.
13
 Despite this similarity, guarantees possess a 
defining characteristic that distinguishes them from indemnities, namely their contingent 
nature. More specifically, the difference between the two contracts is that in a contract of 
guarantee, the surety undertakes a secondary liability to answer for the debtor, who remains 
primarily liable. By contrast, in a contract of indemnity, the surety undertakes a primary 
liability, either on its own or jointly with the principal debtor.
14
 In other words, if a person 
guarantees the obligations or debt of another person, the creditor will typically look first to 
the principal debtor for performance. It is only when the principal debtor has defaulted in its 
obligations that the creditor will turn to the surety for performance.
15
 This difference is 
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aptly described by the following extract quoted by Justice Stratton of the New Brunswick 




The essential differences are, therefore, that a guarantee gives rise to a 
secondary, whereas an indemnity gives rise to a primary obligation and that 
there are, therefore, three parties to a guarantee, the creditor, the debtor, and the 
guarantor, who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of 
another, whereas there are only two parties to an indemnity and if it is a promise 
to indemnify a debtor it is owed to the debtor only, and not because he has failed 
to perform his obligation, but because he has performed it. 
 
The role of guarantees as a contractual security mechanism and their secondary or 
contingent nature in turn give rise to a number of issues. As McGuinness notes, such 
questions include:  
 
to what extent must the creditor look primarily to the principal for performance; 
must the surety be notified of a default by the principal before an action may be 
brought against him; in what way is the liability of the surety affected by 
payments made by the principal; must the creditor look to the proprietary 
securities provided by the principal before calling upon the surety as a secondary 
obligor to perform the guaranteed obligation; what are the rights of the surety in 
such proprietary security; and how is the liability of the surety affected by 
dealings between the creditor and the principal.17  
 
While each of these issues present unique and challenging questions, this paper focuses on 
the last example question, namely how the liability of the surety may be affected by 
dealings between the creditor and the principal. To answer this question, it is important to 
have an understanding of the legal status of sureties.  
 
PART II - SURETYSHIP AND MATERIAL VARIATIONS 
II.I Sureties in the Eyes of the Law 
 In contrast to the position of a principal debtor, sureties are generally considered 
favoured parties in the eyes of the law.
18
 As McGuinness notes, “courts have from time to 
time made reference to this supposed [favoured] status where they wished to prevent 
creditors from taking a perceived undue advantage – the liability of the surety thereby being 
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trimmed to the level which the court perceived to be acceptable.”
19
 This approach and 
treatment of sureties is undeniably rooted in long-standing policy concerns designed to 
ensure that sureties are afforded appropriate protections when facilitating lending 
transactions.
20
 For example, most institutional lenders, franchisors, and other creditors with 
significant market power tend to use standard form contracts when accepting guarantees. 
These contracts, sometimes referred to as “contracts of adhesion,” limit the ability of 
prospective sureties to meaningfully negotiate and underscore the power imbalance that 
often exists in the creditor-surety relationship.
21
 Enhancing this, sureties may be persons of 
limited sophistication and commercial expertise. However, the degree to which sureties 
may be perceived as favoured in law may also depend on a distinction that exists between 
accommodation sureties and compensated sureties.  
As Justice McIntyre for the Supreme Court of Canada described in Citadel General 
Assurance Company v Johns-Manville Canada, accommodation sureties are those sureties 
“who have entered into their contract of surety in the expectation of little or no 
remuneration and for the purpose of accommodating others or of assisting others in the 
accomplishment of their plans.”
22
 For instance, credit arrangements among family members 
may fall within this category. In respect of such arrangements, the law has taken a more 
vigilant approach to protecting accommodation sureties “by strictly construing their 
obligations and limiting them to the precise terms of the contract of surety.”
23
 The practical 
implication of this approach is that any doubt or ambiguity in the guarantee is interpreted 
against the author of the document, in accordance with the contra proferentem rule.
24
 
Compensated sureties, on the other hand, are often highly sophisticated professional surety 
companies, which also tend to have significant experience and interests in the insurance 
industry.
25
 In exchange for guaranteeing performance and payment, these sureties are 
compensated through a financial premium.
26
 On these grounds, compensated sureties are 
generally not afforded the same beneficial treatment that accommodation sureties are said to 
enjoy. As Justice McIntyre went on to note, “The compensated surety cannot escape the 
liability found in the bond merely because of a minor variation in the guaranteed contract or 
because of a trivial failure to meet the bond’s conditions.”
27
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 McGuinness, supra note 2 at 290-291. As McGuinness notes, “The contra proferentem rule is a 
principle of construction which holds that the construction that should be placed upon an ambiguous 
document is the one which is least favourable to the person who put forward the document. It is one of 




 Ibid at 522. 
27
 Johns-Manville, supra note 22 at 514. 
5
Cipollone: The Liabilities of Sureties
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2014
 
With an understanding of the traditional treatment and status of sureties at law and 
the distinction that is sometimes drawn between accommodation and compensated sureties, 
attention can now turn to instances where a surety may be discharged from his or her 
obligations under a guarantee. Though there are a number of instances where this may 
occur, this paper is primarily concerned with the extent to which a surety may be discharged 
from his or her obligations following a material variation to the principal contract between 
the creditor and principal debtor.
28
 For this purpose, it is necessary to look at what courts 
have generally considered to constitute a material variation. 
II.II Material Variations Defined 
 In lending arrangements between creditors and debtors, it is not uncommon for the 
creditor to agree to amend the original contract. Such variations may be in respect of the 
number of payments, the amount of each payment, the interest rate charged under the 
agreement, or the date for repayment of the loan.
29
 These types of amendments are typically 
made once it is apparent to the creditor that the debtor may default or has defaulted under 
the agreement. Often, creditors agree to such compromises in an effort to facilitate 
repayment of the outstanding debt and to avoid commencing legal proceedings to recover 
the debt.
30
 However, such variations may be considered material and, in some instances, 
may relieve a surety from his or her obligations under a guarantee. 
In its most fundamental sense, a material variation is said to be “one that alters the 
business effect of the relationship, so as to vary the risk.”
31
 Such variations may be effected 
by an express agreement between the creditor and principal debtor or, in the absence of 
such an agreement, by a failure to act in accordance with the terms set out in the principal 
contract.
32
 According to McGuinness, a variation is material if it is one that a prudent and 
sensible person would take into consideration when entering into an agreement or 
transaction.
33
 In the case of guarantees, variations to the principal contract are often 
presumed to be material unless they are clearly unsubstantial or beneficial to the position of 
the surety.
34
 In cases where the effect of the variation is unclear, no inquiry is made into 
                                                 
28
 Such instances may include: where a creditor delays in taking action to recover the debt; where there is 
an improper or inappropriate dealing with the security; where there is illegality surrounding the contract 
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provisions. See Joseph E Roach, The Canadian Law of Mortgages, 2d ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada 
Inc, 2010) at 499-500 [Roach]. 
29
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whether the variation is material on the facts of the case.
35
 Rather, if a lack of prejudice is 
not self-evident, the surety is relieved of liability.
36
 While there is an infinite range of 
possible variations that may be considered material, a number of contract modifications 
have been recognized as material variations. Some examples include repeated renewal of a 
loan, an increase in the rate of interest, conversion of a loan into a revolving credit facility, 
exceeding a stipulated credit limit under an agreement, and altering the terms of a 
guaranteed lease in order to prevent the principal from carrying on the type of business 
initially contemplated by the parties.
37
  With an understanding of what may constitute a 
material variation, we can now turn to an analysis of instances when a surety may be 
discharged from his or her obligations following a material variation to the principal 
contract. A review of jurisprudence in this area is required. 
 
PART III - THE LIABILITY OF SURETIES 
III.I The Liability of Sureties Following a Material Variation – The Rule in Holme v 
Brunskill 
 Courts throughout the common law world have questioned the surety’s right to be 
discharged from his or her obligations where there has been a material variation to the 
principal contract. Generally speaking, the courts have held that any material variation to 
the terms of the principal contract made subsequent to the giving of the guarantee without 
the consent or approval of the surety will discharge the liability of the surety.
38
 As Lord 
Loughborough stated in Rees v Berrington, “It is clearest and most evident equity not to 
carry on a transaction without the knowledge of the surety, who must necessarily have a 
concern in every transaction with the principal debtor. You cannot keep him bound and 
transact his affairs (for they are as much his as your own) without consulting him.”
39
 The 
terms of this rule were perhaps most notably set out in the case of Holme v Brunskill.
40
 
According to Lord Justice Cotton, 
 
The true rule in my opinion is, that if there is any agreement between the 
principals with reference to the contract guaranteed, the surety ought to be 
consulted, and that if he has not consented to the alteration, although in cases 
where it is without inquiry evident that the alteration is unsubstantial, or that it 
cannot be otherwise than beneficial to the surety, the surety may not be 
discharged; yet, that if it is not self-evident that the alteration is unsubstantial, or 






 Ibid at 929. 
38
 McGuinness, supra note 2 at 922. 
39
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one which cannot be prejudicial to the surety, the Court…will hold that in such a 
case the surety himself must be the sole judge whether or not he will consent to 





The rule in Holme v Brunskill has since been adopted and applied by Canadian 
courts. In Rose v Aftenberger,
42
 Justice Laskin, then with the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
reiterated the rule as follows: “In my view, the encompassing principle to be applied is that 
a surety is discharged if either the principal contract to which he gave his guarantee is 
varied without his consent in a matter . . . not plainly unsubstantial or necessarily beneficial 
to the guarantor; or, if the terms of the contract of guarantee between the creditor and the 
surety are breached by the creditor.”
43
 
In other words, the relationship of the surety to the creditor and principal debtor is 
such that it safeguards the surety’s position from being altered by an agreement between the 
creditor and principal debtor from that in which the surety stood at the time of the giving of 
the guarantee. However, in the event that a proposed variation may prejudice the position of 
the surety, the creditor must seek the consent of the surety in order to preserve the 
possibility of recourse to the surety.
44
 For McGuinness, the consistent judicial interpretation 
of this rule has allowed for the scope of such a defence to be defined comprehensively.
45
 As 
he notes, “[I]t has been held . . . that a surety is entitled to a discharge even where the 
variation in the contract has not been acted upon.”
46
 Further, he claims that proof of actual 
or certain prejudice to the surety is not required and that a surety may be discharged of his 
or her obligations so long as there is a potential for prejudice.
47
 As one may glean from the 
rule in Holme v Brunskill and its subsequent adoption in Canada, the Canadian judicial 
system has, consistent with the policy concerns discussed above, taken a vigilant approach 
to safeguarding the position of sureties. As a result, sureties have been discharged from 
their obligations in a number of instances. Some examples include where a creditor has 
allowed the debtor to make payments via installment rather than upon maturity, where a 
creditor has agreed to renew the principal contract, where a creditor has stayed the 
execution of a judgment without the consent of a surety, and where a creditor has increased 
the interest rate in exchange for extending the term of a loan.
48
 In this way, a surety may be 
absolutely discharged if the contract between the creditor and the principal debtor is varied 
                                                 
41
 Ibid at 505-506. 
42
 Rose v Aftenberger, [1969] OJ No 1496, [1970] 1 OR 547, 9 DLR (3d) 42 (Ont CA).  
43
 Ibid at para 19. See also Holland-Canada Mortgage Co v Hutchings, [1936] SCR 165 at 172. 
44






 Ibid. See also Pioneer Trust v 220263 Alberta Ltd, [1989] AJ No 56, 42 BLR 266 at 277 (Alta QB).  
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or amended unless “without inquiry it is self-evident that the change is unsubstantial or not 
harmful to the surety,” or “the surety has consented to the change.”
49
 Additionally, given 
that the obligations created under a guarantee are of a contractual nature, it is possible for 
sureties to contract out of the protections provided by the common law or equity.
50
 Despite 
this, Canadian jurisprudence has inconsistently interpreted such agreements, particularly on 
the issue of whether a surety ought to be discharged of his or her obligations. This 
discrepancy is particularly evident when one examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Manulife Bank of Canada v Conlin and the subsequent decision of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v Negin. 
III.II Manulife Bank of Canada v Conlin – The Pinnacle for Sureties 
 The decision in Conlin marked an important point in the law of guarantee and, more 
specifically, the treatment of sureties following a material variation in a principal contract. 
As Jeffrey Lem noted in the last sentence of his annotation of Montreal Trust Co of Canada 
v Birmingham Lodge Ltd, “Conlin is on its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
lending bar waits with bated breath.”
51
 Although a complete review of the case is set out in 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Iacobucci, a brief review of the facts in Conlin is helpful in 
this analysis.  
 The case arose out of a mortgage loan made by Manulife Bank of Canada (the 
creditor) to Dina Conlin (the principal debtor) in the amount of $275,000.
52
 Initially, the 
loan was made for a three-year term and bore an annual interest rate of 11.5 per cent.
53
 Dina 
Conlin provided security for the loan in the form of a first mortgage against lands located in 
Welland, Ontario.
54
 In addition, in order to obtain the loan, two guarantees were required as 
additional security, one from Dina Conlin’s husband and the other from a limited 
company.
55
 According to the guarantee’s terms, the guarantee was to remain binding 
“notwithstanding the giving of time for payment of this mortgage or the varying of the 
terms of payment hereof or the rate of interest hereon.”
56
 Furthermore, the liability of the 
sureties was to be continuous, subsisting “until payment in full of the principal sum and all 
other moneys hereby secured.”
57
  
In 1990, prior to the maturity of the mortgage, Dina Conlin and the creditor 
renewed the mortgage for an additional three-year term at an increased interest rate of 13 
                                                 
49
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50
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51
 Jeffrey Lem, annotation of Montreal Trust Co of Canada v Birmingham Lodge Ltd (1995), 46 RPR 
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52
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per cent per annum.
58
 Although the renewal form provided spaces for the signatures of both 
the registered owner and the sureties, only Dina Conlin signed the agreement.
59
 Her 
husband, from whom she had separated in 1989, was not provided any notice, nor did he 
have any knowledge of the mortgage renewal.
60
 In 1992, Dina Conlin defaulted on the 
mortgage, and the creditor sought to recover.
61
 
At trial, the judge found that according to the “clear and unequivocal language” of 
clauses 7 and 34 (respecting Renewals or Extensions of Time and Guarantee and 
Indemnity, respectively), Conlin’s husband was liable under his guarantee despite the 
renewal of the mortgage and the increase in the interest rate.
62
 However, in a two-to-one 
majority ruling, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial judge and 
released the husband from his obligations under the guarantee.
63
 Both majority opinions 
found that the renewal of the mortgage constituted a material variation of the original 
contract, which had the effect of extinguishing the sureties’ liability and could not be saved 
by the guarantee and indemnity clauses in the agreements.
64
 In accordance with the contra 
proferentem rule, the court held that the clause was to be construed narrowly against the 
creditor.
65
 Under this approach, the court found that the language in the guarantee clause 
did not clearly contemplate the renewal agreement. As a result, the material variation to the 
loan, effected through the renewal agreement, released the sureties from their respective 
obligations.
66
 While both majority opinions stressed the notion that the guarantee ought to 
be strictly interpreted against the creditor, they also placed particular emphasis on the 
favoured treatment traditionally afforded to sureties at law.
67
 The decision was 
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In a four-to-three split decision, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the 
sureties were released from their obligations upon the renewal of the mortgage loan and 
affirmed the notion that a material variation to a principal contract alters the surety’s risk 
and extinguishes liability in the absence of consent.
68
 Writing for the majority, Justice Cory 
agreed with McGuinness and held that to allow unilateral variations by “the principal and 
creditor would amount to a radical departure from the principles of consensus and voluntary 
assumption of duty that form the basis of the law of contract.”
69
 However, as some have 
                                                 
58
 Ibid at para 50. 
59




 Ibid at para 55. 
62
 Ibid at para 57. 
63




 Ibid at para 60. It should be noted that the contra proferentem rule was not invoked by Finlayson JA, 




 Ibid at paras 58-61. 
68
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69
 Ibid at para 3. 
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argued, “the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in [Conlin] may represent the high water 
mark of judicial indulgence for [sureties] in mortgage proceedings.”
70
  
In rendering the judgment, Justice Cory reiterated the rule in Holme v Brunskill as 
follows: “It has long been clear that a [surety] will be released from liability on the 
guarantee in circumstances where the creditor and the principal debtor agree to a material 
alteration of the terms of the contract of debt without the consent of the [surety].”
71
 In 
addition, Justice Cory affirmed the principle in Bauer v Bank of Montreal that parties may 
contract out of the protections traditionally afforded to sureties.
72
 However, the majority 
also drew upon the principle that sureties are “favoured creditors in the eyes of the law 
whose obligation should be strictly examined and strictly enforced.”
73
 While the majority 
did not invoke the contra proferentem rule, it agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
position in Conlin that the language of contracting out provisions must be clear and 
construed narrowly.
74
 On these grounds, the majority held that the language in the 
documents did not contain the necessary clarity.  
 In particular, the majority found a distinction between renewals and extensions of 
contract. In reviewing the documents and arrangements at bar, the majority found that the 
agreement varying the principal contract was a renewal and not an extension.
75
 Applying 
this to the facts of the case, the majority found that since the guarantee provision failed to 
provide for the continuing liability of the surety in the event of a renewal, the surety could 
not have contracted out his rights and was thus relieved of his obligations.
76
 Although the 
majority espoused the importance of the contra proferentem rule, it did not resort to it as 
Justice Cory held that the clauses in the guarantee “unambiguously [indicated] that the 
[surety] was not bound by the renewal.”
77
  
 In addition to the strict interpretation of the guarantee provisions, the majority made 
two other observations that it considered significant. First, the majority recognized the 
distinction between accommodation and compensated sureties, and noted that the sureties 
“in this case [came] within the class of accommodation sureties.”
78
 As the majority went on 
to note, “[I]t follows that if there is a doubt or ambiguity as to the construction or meaning 
of the clauses binding the [surety] in this case, they must be strictly interpreted and resolved 
in favour of the surety.”
79
 Second, in obiter, the majority commented on the fact that the 
renewal agreement contained a signature line for the surety, but that no signature had been 
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 This, as Justice Cory theorized, was a clear indication that the surety was 
expected to sign and consent to the renewal.
81
 Justice Cory went on to note that had a 
signature been obtained, this would have been an indication of both notice and consent to 
the renewal. 
 Interestingly, Justice Iacobucci, writing for the dissent, agreed with a number of the 
principles outlined by the majority. Most notably, he agreed with the principle set out in 
Holme v Brunskill that “any material variation of the terms of a contract between debtor and 
creditor, which is prejudicial to the [surety] and which is made without the [surety’s] 
consent, will discharge the [surety].”
82
 As he noted, “[A]n increase in the rate of interest 
and an extension of the time for payment are both material changes to the loan agreement 
sufficient to discharge a surety.”
83
 Additionally, Justice Iacobucci recognized that the surety 
may waive his or her right to be discharged as a result of a material variation to a principal 
contract.
84
 However, the dissent disagreed with the majority on the interpretation of the 
guarantee. 
 According to Justice Iacobucci, “there is no special rule of construction for 
guarantees. Guarantee contracts are basically contracts, like any others, and should be 
construed according to the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation.”
85
 Instead, the 
primary rule, as he noted, was that the court should give effect to the intentions of parties as 
expressed in their written document.
86
 While he held that the contra preferentem rule may 
be applied where there is ambiguity within a guarantee, he claimed that it is an interpretive 
rule of last resort, only to be used when all other means of ascertaining the intentions of 
parties have failed.
87
 Applying this approach to the interpretation of the guarantee, he was 
not persuaded by the surety’s argument that a renewal is not the same thing as giving time 
for payment.
88
 Instead, he found that “the plain ordinary meaning of the words, the giving 
of time for payment . . . or the varying of the terms of payment [encompassed] the renewal 
agreement and, on these grounds, would have held the surety liable under his guarantee.”
89
  
 Following the decision in Conlin, there was much controversy and concern in the 
lending bar.
90
 Specifically, lenders, commentators, and lending practitioners worried that 
courts would subsequently be less willing to uphold standard form guarantees and material 
variations to principal contracts. As Professor Reuben Rosenblatt wrote in response to the 
decision: 
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Lenders will amend their standard form of guarantee to ensure that the words 
“vary, increase or decrease” are used in addition to the words “alter the terms.” 
Lenders will make sure that whenever they use the word “successor” they will 
also add the word “assigns.” Lenders will amend the standard forms to ensure 





While many lenders modified their agreements to reflect such changes in the wake of 
Conlin, the effect of the decision has not been as problematic as initially anticipated. As 
noted by Gerald Ranking, former chair of Fasken Martineau DuMoulin’s litigation 
department in Ontario, “[R]ather than relieving [sureties] of their obligations, Conlin has 
become a legal impediment which courts have consistently, if not gracefully, avoided in 
order to find in favour of lenders.”
92
 In fact, “[M]ost decisions since [Conlin] have 
distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment on the ground that later agreements 
have not been prone to the same inconsistencies.”
93
 A key example of this is the Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Bank of Montreal v Negin. 
III.III Bank of Montreal v Negin – A Retreat from Conlin 
 The Negin decision was delivered less than two months after Conlin. In fact, the 
Court reserved its judgment and waited for the reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada 
before delivering its final decision.
94
 The appeal in Negin concerned summary judgments 
obtained against both mortgagors and sureties. In particular, the case concerned two 
brothers who “each signed a mortgage with the plaintiff bank, and each brother signed the 
other's mortgage as a [surety].”
95
 On appeal, one of the brothers argued that he was 
discharged as surety because the plaintiff bank renewed the mortgage without his consent.
96
 
The mortgage was renewed for a period of six months beyond its original maturity date, 
while the rate of interest was reduced from 13.5 per cent to 5.75 per cent.
97
 
 In dismissing the appeal, Justice McKinlay held that distinct from Conlin, the terms 
of the guarantee were unambiguous and that the provisions concerning amendments and 
extensions were contained within the guarantee clause.
98
 Similar to Conlin, the guarantee 
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provision contemplated an extension of time, but not a renewal.
99
 However, Justice 
McKinlay did not distinguish between renewals and extensions and instead noted, “[T]he 
most compelling words, in my view, are those which state that the liability of the [surety] 
‘shall continue and be binding on the [surety], and as well after as before default and after 
as before maturity of this mortgage, until the said mortgage moneys are fully paid and 
satisfied.’"
100
 Interestingly, this language bears close resemblance to the guarantee in 
Conlin, which included a “continuous liability [that] shall subsist until payment in full of 
the principal sum and all other moneys hereby secured.”
101
 Despite this, Justice McKinlay 
went on to summarize, the surety “has covenanted to pay the full amount owing on the 
mortgage after as well as before default, and those moneys have not been paid.”
102
 
Additionally, it should be noted that Justice McKinlay claimed that the surety in Negin 
could not be classified as an accommodation surety. Rather, as he remarked, “[E]ach 
brother guaranteed a mortgage of the other. Each did so knowing that he would be liable on 
the mortgage of the other until all amounts owing were paid.”
103
 Presumably, the fact that 
each brother stood as surety for the other in furtherance of the loans represented some 
material benefit sufficient to bring them beyond the scope of an accommodation surety. 
 The reasoning employed by Justice McKinlay appears to resemble that of the 
dissent in Conlin, but it is difficult to reconcile the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision with 
that of the Supreme Court of Canada. While Peter Devonshire, Professor of Law at the 
University of Auckland, notes that “the guarantee clause in Negin strengthened the 
creditor’s position to the extent that liability was deemed to continue after maturity,” he 
questions “whether in the overall scheme this is a truly substantive difference warranting a 
departure from [Conlin].”
104
 Instead, Devonshire submits that the result in Negin may have 
been driven by broader policy concerns, particularly the court’s reluctance to bring into 
question the strength of guarantees in commercial arrangements.
105
 Similarly, Professor 
Rosenblatt questions the extent to which these decisions can be reconciled.
106
 For him, the 
main distinguishing factors are that the renewal term was considerably shorter in Negin (six 
months instead of three years), and the interest rate was reduced not increased.
107
 As such, it 
could be argued that the material variation of the principal contract in Negin did not produce 
a sufficiently adverse impact on the surety’s risk to warrant a complete discharge of the 
obligations under the guarantee.  
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 Despite the undeniable difficulties in trying to reconcile the decisions in Conlin and 
Negin, it appears that the reasoning of the majority in Conlin has not persuaded subsequent 
decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal nor those of the lower courts. Many courts have 
agreed with Conlin’s statement of the law, namely that: (i) a surety will be released from his 
or her obligations under a guarantee where the creditor and principal debtor have agreed to 
a material variation of the principal contract without the consent of the surety, and (ii) that a 
surety can contract out of the protections afforded by the common law or equity provided 
that such language is clear and unambiguous. As in Negin, however, most courts have 
distinguished Conlin on the grounds that subsequent guarantees have not been prone to the 
same inconsistencies.
108
 This is particularly evident in the recent judgment of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions.
109
  
III.IV Royal Bank of Canada v Samson Management & Solutions – Continued Retreat 
from Conlin 
 The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Samson was released on May 13, 2013. 
The appeal concerned the enforceability of a standard form bank guarantee.
110
 The facts of 
the case are as follows.  
In 2005, Ms. Cusack and her husband, Mr. Brasseur, provided continuing 
guarantees for the indebtedness of Mr. Brasseur’s business, Samson, to the Royal Bank of 
Canada (“RBC”) for $150,000.
111
 In 2006, RBC agreed to increase the limit on Samson’s 
line of credit to a maximum of $250,000.
112
 In furtherance of the limit increase, Ms. Cusack 
and Mr. Brasseur each provided fresh personal guarantees for $250,000 to RBC.
113
 
Subsequently, the amount covered by the loan agreement was increased on two 
occasions—to $500,000 in 2008 and to $750,000 in 2009.
114
 Although RBC received new 
personal guarantees from Mr. Brasseur in respect of each increase, it did not request new 
guarantees from Ms. Cusack.
115
 In 2011, Samson failed, and RBC made demands on Mr. 
Brasseur and Ms. Cusack under their personal guarantees, namely his 2009 guarantee and 
her 2006 guarantee.
116
 While the motion judge granted summary judgment to RBC against 
Samson and Mr. Brasseur on his personal guarantee, he refused to grant RBC summary 
judgment against Ms. Cusack and, instead, granted her summary judgment on her cross-
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motion to dismiss RBC’s action against her.
117
 Following this, RBC appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal and, as Justice Lauwers noted, “[T]here is a single issue in this case . . . . 




 Like in other decisions since Negin, the Court of Appeal recognized that the basic 
governing law was set out in Conlin.
119
 In a parallel fashion, the Court of Appeal laid out 
the long-standing legal principle in Holme v Brunskill, but also noted that under Conlin a 
surety can contract out of the protection provided by the common law or equity.
120
 In the 
end, however, Conlin was distinguished from the facts at bar “as a case not involving a 




In conducting its analysis, the Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that 
there had been material variations in the loan arrangements made between RBC and 
Samson about which Ms. Cusack had not been consulted and that increased her risk, even 
though her financial exposure was capped at $250,000.
122
 The court noted that these 
variations would have discharged Ms. Cusack from liability under the guarantee in the 
absence of either her consent or clear language. The court also claimed that the motion 
judge erred by failing to interpret the language of the guarantee in order to determine 
whether Ms. Cusack had contracted out of her right to be notified of such variations.
123
  
 Looking at the guarantee in the context of the transaction as a whole, the court 
found that the language of the guarantee was broad and plainly designed to ensure that the 
surety contracted out of the ordinary protections afforded under the common law and 
equity.
124
 More specifically, the Court found that certain excerpts from provisions in the 
guarantee indicated that Ms. Cusack had contracted out of her right to be notified of any 
variations. The excerpts that the Court placed particular emphasis on are as follows. 
 The first paragraph of the guarantee provided that Ms. Cusack would pay on 
demand to RBC “all debts and liabilities, present or future, direct or indirect, absolute or 
contingent, mature or not, at any time owing by . . .” Samson to RBC “or remaining unpaid 
by the customer to the Bank, heretofore or hereafter incurred or arising and . . . incurred by 
or arising from agreement or dealings between the Bank and the customer . . .”
125
 This 
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provision, as the Court noted, “[made] it clear that RBC could increase the amount of its 
loan to Samson and Ms. Cusack would remain liable under the guarantee.”
126
 According to 
the Court, this was reinforced by the fact that a letter of independent legal advice, 
acknowledged by Ms. Cusack, stated that the guarantee was “for the purpose of securing 
the liabilities, whether past, present or future, of Samson.”
127
 In addition, the Court noted 
that the continuing obligation of Ms. Cusack was clearly expressed in clause two, which 
provided: “This guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee and shall cover all the liabilities, 




Lastly, the Court found that various clauses throughout the guarantee expressly 
permitted RBC to take actions that might or would otherwise be material variations 
affecting the enforceability of the guarantee at common law or equity, such as extending 
time for payment, renewing the loan arrangements, increasing the interest rate, changing the 
maturity date of any loan, and introducing new terms and conditions to the borrowing.
129
 
 On the basis of the language included in the guarantee, the Court went on to find 
that Ms. Cusack had contracted out of the protection provided by the common law and 
equity and was therefore liable under the guarantee. According to the Court, “[Ms. Cusack] 
knew and accepted that Samson’s indebtedness to RBC could increase in the future even 
though her guarantee was limited.”
130
 While the Court acknowledged that the subsequent 
increases in the credit facility were material variations to the principal loan contract, it held 
that these variations were contemplated by the parties and permitted under the guarantee.
131
 
Consequently, despite the material variations in the underlying loan arrangements, Ms. 
Cusack’s personal guarantee remained enforceable given the clear and unambiguous 
language of the guarantee and the factual context.
132
  
 The Court of Appeal’s decision in Samson reflects the emphasis courts have placed 
on the notion that transacting parties “are entitled to make their own arrangements and 
[that] a [surety’s] decision to contract out of the protection provided by the common law or 
equity will usually be respected by the courts[.]”
133
 Furthermore, the decision stands as a 
key example of the continuing preference of lower courts to distinguish cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Conlin. As some lending practitioners have argued, 
the decision in Samson is a clear indication that the long-established case law upholding the 
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validity and enforceability of guarantees remains intact.
134
 Though it may be argued that 
Samson involved a continuing guarantee that sufficiently distinguished it from Conlin, it is 
arguable that the guarantee in Conlin possessed similar continuing language as evidenced 
by the analysis above. Nonetheless, the decision represents the continued commitment of 
the courts to promote legal certainty and uphold the validity and enforceability of 
guarantees and their role in facilitating the extension of credit. In fact, it should be noted 
that the decision in Samson marks the second time in 2013 that the Ontario Court of Appeal 
“has enforced the provisions of a ‘plain-vanilla standard form bank guarantee’ in the 
context of a business loan.”
135
 It is also important to note that the Supreme Court of Canada 
recently dismissed the leave to appeal application in Samson in November 2013.
136
 Taken 
together, these decisions, combined with those following Conlin and Negin, suggest that in 
guarantee transactions courts are, for the most part, reluctant to intervene and afford sureties 
the traditionally favoured status that they have enjoyed at law. 
 Despite the legal certainty promoted by Samson, lenders and lending practitioners 
would be well advised to continue to consult and seek the consent of sureties when 
contemplating material variations to loan arrangements. As many of these cases, including 
Samson, emphasize the language used in the actual guarantee, it is also prudent for lenders 
to examine their lending documentation and make any necessary revisions so as to ensure 
that “the contracting-out language is clear and unambiguous.”
137
 As lawyer Stephen 
Gillespie remarked in his paper for the Law Society of Upper Canada,  
 
The only foolproof method of ensuring that a surety will be bound by a 
guarantee in the face of circumstances that would give rise to a defence is to 
obtain the consent of the surety. This should always be done when 
circumstances arise which may give rise to a defence, regardless of how 
comprehensive the language of the guarantee may be and even if it is not clear 




That being said, lenders may take some comfort in the fact that the risk of failing to do so 
may be somewhat lessened as courts show a clear preference for upholding and enforcing 
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well-crafted guarantees. Ultimately, whether the legal certainty espoused by Samson and 
similar decisions will continue into the future remains to be seen.  
 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
 Guarantees play an important role in facilitating the extension and free flow of 
credit in contemporary commerce. In fact, guarantees are among the most common forms 
of security used in commercial lending arrangements. Historically, the law has recognized 
the unique contingent nature of the liability assumed by sureties and, as a result, has treated 
them as favoured parties in lending arrangements. This is particularly true in the event of a 
material variation to the principal contract between a creditor and principal debtor. In such 
instances, courts have traditionally held that any material variation of the terms of a contract 
between the creditor and debtor, which is prejudicial to the surety and is made without the 
surety’s consent, will relieve the surety of his or her obligations under the guarantee.  
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this long-standing principle in Conlin, 
where the Court discharged a surety following a material variation to the principal contract 
to which the surety had not consented. However, despite this ruling, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Negin, a case with very similar facts to those in Conlin, held that the guarantee 
clearly and unambiguously waived the surety’s rights and protections under the common 
law and equity. On these grounds, the Court of Appeal upheld the guarantee and held the 
surety liable. Intriguingly, similar to Negin, most Ontario decisions since Conlin have 
distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment on the grounds that later guarantees 
have not been prone to the same inconsistencies. This is particularly true when one 
considers the Ontario Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Samson, where the Court 
distinguished the case from that in Conlin and held the surety liable under her guarantee.  
While it is undeniably difficult to reconcile these decisions, a few conclusions can 
be drawn. First, the course of jurisprudence in Ontario makes clear that courts have a 
preference for legal certainty in lending arrangements involving guarantees and are 
reluctant to intervene where transacting parties have agreed to contract out of the 
protections afforded by the common law or equity. Second, the decision in Conlin may 
represent the high point of judicial indulgence for sureties in lending arrangements as the 
subsequent case law questions the extent to which sureties may still enjoy favoured status at 
law. Third, and perhaps most notably, the decisions signal the importance of well-drafted 
guarantees. Ultimately, while lenders may take some comfort in the trajectory that 
jurisprudence in Ontario has taken since Conlin, it remains to be seen whether this 
commitment to legal certainty will be long lasting. As a result, despite the current 
preference for courts to respect and uphold guarantees, it remains highly advisable for 
lenders to seek out and obtain the consent of sureties when contemplating material 
variations to their loan arrangements.  
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